A Backward Method to Estimate the Dai-ichi Reactor Core Damage Using Radiation Exposure in the Environment by Udiyani, P. M. (P) et al.
P.M. Udiyani et al. / Atom Indonesia Vol. 42 No. 2  (2016 ) 63 - 70 
 
 
 
A Backward Method to Estimate the Dai-ichi 
Reactor Core Damage Using Radiation Exposure 
in the Environment 
 
P.M. Udiyani*, S. Kuntjoro and S.Widodo 
Center for  Nuclear Reactor Technology and Safety, National Nuclear Energy Agency 
Puspiptek Area Serpong, Tangerang Selatan 15310, Indonesia 
 
 
A R T I C L E   I N F O A B S T R A C T 
 
 
 
Article history: 
Received 30 October 2015 
Received in revised form 29 March 2016 
Accepted 31 March 2016 
 
 
Keywords: 
Backwards method 
Source term 
Dai-ichi reactor 
Core damaged 
 
 
The Fukushima accident resulted in the melting of the reactor core due to loss                   
of supply of coolant when the reactor stopped from operating conditions.                      
The earthquake and tsunami caused loss of electricity due to the flooding that 
occurred in the reactor. The absence of the coolant supply after reactor shutdown 
resulted in heat accumulation, causing the temperature of the fuel to rise beyond its 
melting point. In the early stages of the accident, operator could not determine the 
severity of the accident and the percentage of the reactor core damaged.                       
The available data was based on the radiation exposure in the environment that was 
reported by the authorities. The aim of this paper is to determine the severity of the 
conditions in the reactor core based on the radiation doses measured in the 
environment. The method is performed by backward counting based on the 
measuring radiation exposure and radionuclides releases source term.                             
The calculation was performed by using the PC-COSYMA code. The results 
showed that the core damage fraction at Dai-ichi  Unit 1 was 70%, and the resulting 
individual effective dose in the exclusion area is 401 mSv, while the core damage 
fraction at Unit 2 was 30%, and the resulting individual effective dose was                    
99.1 mSv, while for Unit 3, the core damage fraction was 25% for an individual 
effective dose of 92.2 mSv. The differences between the results of the calculation 
for estimation of core damage proposed in this paper with the previously reported 
results is probably caused by the applied model for assessment, differences in 
postulations and assumptions, and the incompleteness of the input data.                             
This difference could be reduced by performing calculations and simulations for 
more varied assumptions and postulations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant 
(NPP) consists of six boiling water reactors 
(BWRs). The first unit is a 460-MWe BWR/3 that 
reached its first criticality in October 1970.                   
The second unit is a 784-MWe BWR/4 that reached 
its first criticality on July 18, 1974. The third and 
the forth units are also 784-MWe BWR/4's but they 
reached their first criticalities on different dates.  
The third unit reached its first criticality on                   
                                                 

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March 27, 1976, while the fourth unit reached first 
criticality on October 12, 1978. The fifth unit is also 
a 784-MWe BWR/4 and reached its first criticality 
on April 18, 1978. The last unit is a 1100-MWe 
BWR/5 that reached its first criticality on October 
24, 1979. Those reactors use Mark I containments, 
except for the last unit which uses Mark II 
containment [1] 
At the time of the April 2011 Fukushima 
earthquake, Units 1-3 were operating and Units 4-6 
were in refueling/maintenance outages. All of the 
operating reactors (Units 1-3) were shutdown/ scram 
automatically after the earthquake [1]. The sequence 
of the subsequent events is as follows. In the early 
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stages, early core degradation occurred with core 
heat-up due to the decay of fission products, 
followed by core material oxidation by steam, 
liquefaction and melting of core materials, release 
and transport of fission products, and loss of core 
geometry. Afterwards, inside the vessel, massive 
melt formation occurred in the core, followed by the 
relocation of the melt to the lower head, formation 
of molten pool with crust, gap cooling, thermal 
attack on vessel wall, and finally vessel failure. 
Then, outside the now-failed vessel, molten core-
concrete interaction occurred, along with behavior 
change of concrete basement and cooling of the 
debris bed and pools. The resulting source term was 
transported in the cooling system, in the 
containment, and finally experienced containment 
bypass. Moreover, radiological contamination 
spread into the environment [2-4]. During the early 
phases of the accident, experts could not determine 
how severe the accident was. They could not 
measure the core damage percentage because the 
radiation level around reactor was very high. The 
available data consisted only of the radiation dose 
measured in the environment that was reported by 
the authorities. 
Prior to this work, the failure of the core have 
been estimated and assessed by several experts. 
Several methods have been applied to find how 
large the damage of the reactor core was, because 
the accidents occurred in a complicated manner 
[5,6]. The method used by previous researchers was 
to estimate core damage by probabilistic and 
deterministic methods. The probabilistic method is a 
method for calculating the core damage frequency. 
The deterministic method is a method to calculate 
core damage based on certain assumptions and 
postulations on the initiating event and the type of 
accidents. This method requires detailed data on 
reactor condition. This method is time-consuming 
and involves intricate calculations in obtaining the 
source-term data.  
The consequences and risks to the 
environment are calculated based on the source 
term. The advantage of this method is that it gives 
more accurate data on reactor conditions. The 
disadvantage of this method is that when it is used 
for assessment of severe accident management, such 
as for the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, it takes 
more time. In a severe accident conditions, it is 
necessary to be fast in estimating the severity of the 
reactor accident, so that the operators can more 
quickly implement the Emergency Operating 
Procedures (EOP) or Severe Accident Management 
Guidelines (SAMGs). 
This paper attempts to propose a method to 
obtain a first estimate that is obtainable early and 
rapidly, but also sufficiently accurate, of the severity 
of the conditions of the reactor core. The method is 
carried out by counting backwards, starting from the 
radiation dose measured in the environment and 
then regressing to determining the source term 
released from the containment. The backward 
method was applied to the calculation of core 
damage, because it made it possible for the result of 
the estimates to be compared to real-time conditions 
that occurred around the NPP location in 
Fukushima. 
The goal of this assessment is to estimate the 
extent and severity of accidents or core damages 
based on the measured environment radiation dose. 
A case study is conducted based on the Fukushima 
accident data, by the method of counting backwards 
from measured doses associated with the fission 
products released to the atmosphere. The 
meteorological data of Fukushima and the source 
term of the core damage are used in this assessment. 
The calculation starts by calculating the 
fission products released to the atmosphere based on 
radiation dose measurements [7]. The fission 
products release is calculated based on source term 
and meteorology data as input data. The source term 
for the Unit 1 reactor was estimated by using the 
severe accident postulation models, in which                   
the core melt fraction is assumed to be in the                    
50-80% range.  
The postulated Design Basis Accident (DBA) 
was used to calculate the source term for Units 2-3, 
for which their core damage fractions were assumed 
to be between 20% and 40%. Core damage fraction 
estimation results obtained using the backward 
method were compared to the estimations by other 
researchers. 
 
 
EXPERIMENTAL METHODS 
 
Assessment modeling 
 
The assessment modeling in this paper uses 
the backward method, following the steps shown in 
Fig. 1. The calculation starts by calculating the 
fission products released to the atmosphere at 
Fukushima area based on the radiation dose which 
was measured in the environment (step 1). Using 
local meteorological data as input data, the activities 
of the fission products associated with the source 
term are estimated (steps 2-4). The postulated 
reactor accident and an estimate of the core melt 
severity were assumed, and the results of 
calculations based on the assumptions are compared 
to the known or reference data on the fission 
products dispersed in the atmosphere and in the 
reactor core (steps 5-8).  
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Fig. 1. Flowchart of assessment modeling. 
 
 
Core inventory calculation 
 
Based on the data in Table 1, the core 
inventory is calculated using Origen 2.2.                    
Other inputs for the calculation are the amount              
and composition of uranium for each                       
reactor, average burnup, conditions at the end                  
of a full power cycle, irradiation time, and reactor 
power [7,8]. 
 
Table 1. Fukushima Dai-ichi Reactors Specifications [8] 
 
Unit 
Electric / 
Thermal Power 
(MW) 
 
Type of 
Reactor 
Number of  fuel rods 
Core Spent fuel 
Unit 1 460 / 1380 BWR/3 400 292 
Unit 2 784 / 2381 BWR/4 548 587 
Unit 3 784 / 2381 BWR/4 548 514 
 
The fuel assemblies are about 4 m long.                    
There are 400 assemblies in Unit 1, 548 in                   
Units 2-5 each, and 764 in Unit 6. Each assembly 
consists of 60 fuel rods containing uranium                   
oxide fuel enclosed by zirconium alloy                         
cladding. Unit 3 has a partial core of mixed-oxide 
(MOX) fuel (32 MOX assemblies,                                       
516 LEU). Normally, they all run at a core outlet 
temperature of 286°C under a pressure of                                 
6930 kPa with a dry containment pressure of                        
115-130 kPa.  
For estimating the core inventories,                             
the 
235
U enrichment is taken as 3.0% for                             
Dai-ichi Units 2-3 and less than 3% for Unit 1.                     
The burnups and fuel loads used are an                           
average burnup of 30 000 MWd/tU and                              
and a fuel load of 68 tU for Unit 1,                                     
and 23 000 MWd/tU and 94 tU for Unit 2                            
and Unit 3 [1,8]. A full power cycle is                             
assumed as involving three years of irradiation.                    
The result of the calculation is an estimation                        
of the activity of the fission products which                       
form in the fuel. The results of the calculations are 
shows in Table 2.  
Table 2. Activities of Fission Products  in Core Inventory [8] 
 
Nuclide Core Inventory Activity (Bq) 
Unit-1 Unit-2 Unit-3 
85Kr 1.91E+16 3.34E+16 3.34E+16 
85mKr 2.99E+17 5.18 E+17 5.18E+17 
88Kr 7.94E+17 1.37E+18 1.37E+18 
133Xe 2.48E+18 4.29E+18 4.29E+18 
135Xe 7.24E+17 1.25E+18 1.25E+18 
131I 1.27E+18 2.19E+18 2.19E+18 
132I 1.82E+18 3.15E+18 3.15E+18 
133I 2.55E+18 4.41E+18 4.41E+18 
135I 2.38E+18 4.12E+18 4.12E+18 
132Te 1.78E+18 3.07E+18 3.07E+18 
134Cs 3.08E+17 5.32E+17 5.32E+17 
137Cs 2.06E+17 3.56E+17 3.56E+17 
90Sr 1.36E+17 2.35E+17 2.35E+17 
106Ru 9.11E+17 1.57E+18 1.57E+18 
140Ba 2.17E+18 3.75E+18 3.75E+18 
144Ce 1.64E+18 2.84E+18 2.84E+18 
 
 
Core damage estimation 
 
Based on the released fission products data, 
the severity of the core damage is estimated by 
making assumptions of reactor accident type and 
severity, and comparing the estimates resulting from 
using the assumptions in the calculation, with the 
known data on the amount of fission products 
dispersed in the atmosphere and in the reactor core. 
Here, two types of accidents were assumed to have 
occurred, namely the postulated core meltdown by 
severe accident for Unit 1 and the DBA (Design 
Basis Accident) for Units 2 and 3, respectively. 
Two severe accident postulations were 
chosen, namely a severe accident condition with the 
assumption of 50-80% core damage fraction used 
for reactor Unit-1, and the DBA condition for Unit-
2 and Unit-3 with core damage fraction assumed to 
be 20-40% [6,7]. 
 
 
Fission product release (source term) 
estimation 
 
The calculation of fission product release is 
represented as step 2 in Fig. 1. By assuming a severe 
accident [5], the source term calculation was carried 
out using the data in Table 1 and Table 2.                    
The source term is calculated starting from the 
fission product release from the damaged core, to 
the cooling system, and then to the containment. 
The containment is equipped with spray safety 
systems. The fission product of 
131
I is first retained 
in the containment, and partly released into the 
environment. Fission product release will be 
reduced by filtering system in the stack into the 
environment [9]. Based on the fission product 
release data with the postulated reactor accident, 
assumptions were made on the core melt severity. 
Core 
Inventory 
Core 
Meltdown 
Source 
term 
(4) (5) 
Radiation 
Dose 
(1) 
(8) 
(3) 
(6) 
Fission 
Product  
Disperse 
(2) 
(7) 
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The input data for this calculation are the activity of 
the fission product in core inventory, assumptions 
on core damage, release mechanism, and release 
fraction for each subsystem. 
For Unit 1, the source term associated with 
the postulation was estimated by using the models 
based on the severe accident scenario, where the 
assumption of 50-80% core damage fraction is used. 
Other assumptions made were: the emergency core 
cooling system (ECCS) did not work; the 
containment integrity was maintained; the spray 
systems were not functioning; and: release through 
the stack occurred without filter system. The release 
fraction of fission products into the containment was 
100% for noble gases, 50% for iodine, and 1% for 
other nuclides. The calculation was performed for  
assumptions of core damage fractions of 50%,            
55%, 60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, and 80% [6,7].                 
The calculation's outputs, namely the source term 
activities associated with those assumptions, are 
shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Source term (Bq) for Dai-ichi Unit 1 
 
Nuclide 
Core damage fraction (%) 
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 
85Kr 9.55E+15 1.05E+16 1.15E+16 1.24E+16 1.34E+16 1.43E+16 1.53E+16 
85mKr 1.50E+17 1.64E+17 1.79E+17 1.94E+17 2.09E+17 2.24E+17 2.39E+17 
88Kr 3.97E+17 4.37E+17 4.76E+17 5.16E+17 5.56E+17 5.96E+17 6.35E+17 
133Xe 1.24E+18 1.36E+18 1.49E+18 1.61E+18 1.74E+18 1.86E+18 1.98E+18 
135Xe 3.62E+17 3.98E+17 4.34E+17 4.71E+17 5.07E+17 5.43E+17 5.79E+17 
131I 3.40E+16 3.48E+16 4.08E+16 4.42E+16 4.76E+16 5.02E+16 5.44E+16 
132I 2.28E+17 2.51E+17 2.73E+17 2.96E+17 3.19E+17 6.83E+16 3.64E+17 
133I 4.45E+17 4.90E+17 5.34E+17 5.79E+17 6.23E+17 6.34E+17 7.12E+17 
135I 3.18E+17 3.49E+17 3.81E+17 4.13E+17 4.45E+17 4.76E+17 5.08E+17 
132Te 4.55E+17 5.01E+17 5.46E+17 5.92E+17 6.37E+17 6.83E+17 7.28E+17 
134Cs 6.38E+17 7.01E+17 7.65E+17 8.29E+17 8.93E+17 9.56E+17 1.02E+18 
137Cs 5.95E+17 6.55E+17 7.14E+17 7.74E+17 8.33E+17 8.93E+17 9.52E+17 
90Sr 7.70E+16 8.47E+16 9.24E+16 1.00E+17 1.08E+17 1.11E+17 1.23E+17 
106Ru 5.15E+16 5.67E+16 6.18E+16 6.70E+16 7.21E+16 7.55E+17 8.24E+17 
140Ba 5.43E+17 5.97E+17 6.51E+17 7.05E+17 7.60E+17 7.63E+17 8.68E+17 
144Ce 4.10E+17 4.51E+17 4.92E+17 5.33E+17 5.74E+17 6.23E+17 6.56E+17 
 
For Unit 2 and Unit 3, the models used were 
based on the DBA postulation with core                        
melt fraction assumed to be 20-40%. Further 
assumptions were: the emergency core cooling 
system (ECCS) function was limited; containment 
vessel structural integrity was not compromised; 
spray systems were still functioning; fission product 
releases occurred through the stack; and: stack filter 
system was still functioning. In the containment, 
spray system reduced iodine nuclides by 46%.              
The efficiency of the filter in the reactor stack is                 
0% for noble gases, 99% for iodine (organic), and 
99% for other nuclides (Te, Cs, Rb). The calculation 
was performed for core damage fraction 
assumptions of 50%, 55%, 60%, 65%, 70%, 75% 
and 80% [7]. The source term activities obtained 
under those assumptions are shown in Table 4.  
Table 4. Source terms (Bq) for Dai-ichi Unit 2 and Unit 3 
 
Nuclide 
Core damage fraction (%) 
20 25 30 35 40 
85Kr 6.68E+15 8.35E+15 1.00E+16 1.17E+16 1.34E+16 
85mKr 1.04E+17 1.30E+17 1.55E+17 1.81E+17 2.07E+17 
88Kr 2.74E+17 3.43E+17 4.11E+17 4.80E+17 5.48E+17 
133Xe 8.58E+17 1.07E+18 1.29E+18 1.50E+18 1.72E+18 
135Xe 2.50E+17 3.13E+17 3.75E+17 4.38E+17 5.00E+17 
131I 4.70E+12 5.88E+12 7.05E+12 8.23E+12 9.40E+12 
132I 3.14E+13 3.93E+13 4.71E+13 5.50E+13 6.28E+13 
133I 6.14E+13 7.68E+13 9.21E+13 1.07E+14 1.23E+14 
135I 1.01E+16 1.26E+16 1.51E+16 1.76E+16 2.01E+16 
132Te 1.45E+16 1.81E+16 2.17E+16 2.54E+16 2.90E+16 
134Cs 2.03E+16 2.54E+16 3.04E+16 3.55E+16 4.06E+16 
137Cs 1.90E+16 2.37E+16 2.84E+16 3.32E+16 3.79E+16 
90Sr 1.06E+13 1.33E+13 1.60E+13 1.86E+13 2.13E+13 
106Ru 7.12E+12 8.90E+12 1.07E+13 1.25E+13 1.42E+13 
140Ba 7.50E+13 9.38E+13 1.13E+14 1.31E+14 1.50E+14 
144Ce 5.68E+13 7.10E+13 8.52E+13 9.94E+13 1.14E+14 
 
 
Fission product dispersion and dose 
calculation  
 
The calculations are based on the observed 
doses. The calculation of fission product release to  
the atmosphere was performed using PC-Cosyma 
code [7]. PC-Cosyma is a dose consequence 
assessment computer code, with segmented 
Gaussian diffusion model using source data derived 
from accident scenarios. This computer code can be 
used to calculate the following:  hourly changes in 
meteorological conditions; horizontal and vertical 
dispersion parameter for various surface roughness 
as a release height function; plume rise; building-
induced downwash, and: radioactive decay and 
daughter in-growth. The input data used in                   
the calculation process are the source term, 
meteorological data, and the release height.                         
The meteorological data consists of wind direction, 
wind speed (m/s), season (winter or summer), 
stability category, altitude at which the wind speed 
is measured, and surface roughness (smooth terrain 
or rough terrain). 
Using local meteorological data, the fission 
product dispersion (air dispersion and deposition              
on the ground surface) and dose could be calculated 
for various pathways (cloud shine and ground  
shine) [10,11].  
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Core inventory 
 
Fission product activities in the inventory for 
the cores of the Unit 1, Unit 2, and Unit 3 reactors 
are shown in Table 2. Fission product activities in 
the core inventory are affected by the amount and 
composition of uranium fuel, reactor power or 
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burnup, and irradiation time. Table 2 shows                     
the inventory of fission products, such                         
as noble gases (Kr and Xe), iodine isotopes,                         
and metallic fission products (Sr, Cs, Ba),                     
inside the core. As shown in Table 2, the                        
activity of fission products in the Unit 2 and                           
Unit 3 reactor cores are higher than in Unit 1's                           
core. The core of Unit 2 and Unit 3 has 548 fuel 
assemblies each, while Unit-1 has 400 fuel 
assemblies. Fission product activities in the                      
core are influenced by the weight of uranium;                     
the higher the amount of uranium is, the higher                 
the activity is.  
 
 
Reactor source term 
 
By assuming a severe accident, the                      
source term calculations were carried out                      
using the data in Table 3 and Table 4.                             
Table 3 shows the calculation results of fission 
products release under severe accident scenarios,
 
using data on Table 1 and Table 2. It shows                
that the source term of Unit 1 has                                
higher activity than that of Unit 2 and Unit 3.                 
From comparison of the activity of inventories                
in Table 2, it is seen that the source term                               
in Unit 3 was the smallest one. The results                         
of source term calculation depend on                                     
the core integrity and the occurrence of core                         
failure. Since the source term for Unit 1                          
was estimated using the models based                               
on severe accident where it is assumed that                          
50-80% of the core melts, even though                               
Unit 1 has the smallest core inventory                        
activity, it releases the most fission products                      
to the air.  
Calculations for Unit 2 and Unit 3 used 
models based on the DBA postulations                     
where the core melt is assumed to be                                  
20-40%. In addition, the containment                                   
integrity also influences the source                                   
term release. Containment integrity corresponds                    
to the function of the stack HEPA filter.                                    
If the containment is damaged, it can be                          
considered that the filter is not functioning                         
properly, although in normal condition                                   
a HEPA filter could capture 90% of the                               
iodine and 99% of other fission products.                         
Source term calculation results depend                                  
on the postulations and assumptions                                         
on the magnitude of core damage. The level                         
of confidence in the condition that occurs                               
will also result in different calculations                                
such as pessimistic calculations or optimistic 
calculations.  
Fission product dispersion and radiation 
dose in the environment 
 
Based on these radiological observations,                
the calculation of fission products releases                         
in the atmosphere at Fukushima area was 
performed. As the basis for calculating the                    
dose rate, the value of 50-400 mSv,                         
obtained from dose monitoring on 15-16 March 
2011 [6,8], was used. The assumed value                        
of the dose was observed within a radius of                         
500 m from the Unit 1, Unit 2, and Unit 3                             
reactors. By using the meteorological                             
data at the Fukushima area when the                              
doses were measured, fission products                         
dispersion has been estimated. Calculations                          
can be performed for different core damages,                     
and calculation based on data from experiments                   
can produce a more accurate results;                                    
it will more accurately estimate the core damage                 
and proper functioning of safety systems                        
inside  a reactor.  
The dose calculations were performed                     
for short-term individual effective dose                             
and long-term individual effective dose                           
for each radius [12]. Exposures in long-term 
individual doses were modeled through                    
cloud shine and ground shine pathways,                        
while the calculations for the long-term                          
doses were modeled through ground shine                      
pathway (via the food chain). The potential 
exposure situation for a nuclear reactor                        
facility was not a typical accident affected                         
by the fuel in the core which releases                          
radioactive material to the environment [13].                     
Thus, the effects to the public and the types of 
consequences may be different. 
The dose data in Table 5 indicates                      
a short dose in the range of 24-48 hours                                   
after the accident and calculated for each unit.                 
Dose calculation results at 800 m (exclusion area) 
for Unit 1 ranges between 140 to 470 mSv                       
for the core damage fractions in the 50% to                    
80% range. The backward method was based on 
real-time measured dose to estimate the core 
damage. Based on the measured dose in the 
environment in the exclusion area of Unit 1, the core 
damage can be estimated. Based on Table 5 and  
Fig. 2 for real-time measured dose of 385 to                 
400 mSv, the core damage for Unit 1 was estimated 
to range from 50% to 70%. IAEA reported that core 
damage fraction in Unit 1 was 70% on the b sis of 
the measured dose of approximately 400 mSv 
[6,8,14]. It indicates that the backward method in 
this paper can estimate the core damage fraction and 
the severity of accident. 
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Table 5. Short term individual effective dose vs distance on 
various core damaged on Dai-ichi Unit-1 
 
Distance (km) 
Short term individual effective dose vs distance for various core 
damage fractions for Dai-ichi Unit-1 (mSv) 
 
50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 
0.5 1.48E+02 1.67E+02 3.49E+02 3.82E+02 4.01E+02 4.40E+02 4.69E+02 
1 1.14E+02 1.29E+02 2.68E+02 2.93E+02 3.15E+02 3.38E+02 3.60E+02 
3 5.89E+01 6.69E+01 1.39E+02 1.53E+02 1.64E+02 1.76E+02 1.87E+02 
5 3.24E+01 3.67E+01 7.66E+01 8.38E+01 9.02E+01 9.67E+01 1.03E+02 
10 1.16E+01 1.32E+01 2.75E+01 3.01E+01 3.24E+01 3.47E+01 3.70E+01 
20 4.56E+00 5.18E+00 1.08E+01 1.18E+01 1.27E+01 1.37E+01 1.45E+01 
30 3.09E+00 3.51E+00 7.31E+00 8.02E+00 8.62E+00 9.25E+00 9.84E+00 
40 2.28E+00 2.60E+00 5.40E+00 5.93E+00 6.38E+00 6.84E+00 7.28E+00 
50 3.52E+00 4.07E+00 8.26E+00 9.07E+00 9.75E+00 1.05E+01 1.11E+01 
60 1.84E+00 2.10E+00 4.35E+00 4.78E+00 5.14E+00 5.51E+00 5.87E+00 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Short-term effective dose vs distance for various core 
damage fractions for Dai-ichi Unit 1. 
 
This method can also be used for determining 
the emergency response that should be taken to 
mitigate the consequences of this accident. Based on 
the data in Fig. 2, the countermeasures such as 
evacuation, relocation, and area decontamination 
can be estimated. The results obtained by simulation 
using the backward method in this paper showed no 
significant difference with the countermeasures 
actually taken by the authorities in Fukushima [6]. 
The determined long-term dose can be used to 
estimate the needed long-term countermeasures 
such as relocation and area decontamination.               
Figure 3 gives the magnitude of dose without 
decontamination action. The dose will decrease if 
the decontamination is intensive and massive.                   
If decontamination has been performed, the area 
whose inhabitants are to be relocated and the 
duration of relocation will be reduced. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Long-term effective dose vs. distance for various core 
damage fractions for Dai-ichi Unit 1. 
 
The calculation of source term for Unit 2 and 
Unit 3 follows the postulates and assumptions of the 
Design Basis Accident (DBA). The accident 
postulated by the DBA is lighter than the 
postulation of severe accident. With a smaller 
source term (Table 4), the dose calculation results 
range from 80-103 mSv (exclusion area) for the core 
damage fractions of 20% to 40%. 
Based on Table 6 and Fig. 4 for the reported 
dose at exclusion area were 80 to 100 mSv, the core 
damage fractions for Unit 2 and Unit 3 ranged               
from 20% to 40%. IAEA reported that core                     
damage occurring in Unit-2 was 30%. From              
Table 6, the associated dose is 99.1 mSv [14]. In the 
same manner, for Unit 3 the core damage fraction 
was 25% for 92.2 mSv (Table 6 and Fig. 4). If we 
compare the results of backward calculation 
method, it is found that the results are still within 
the range measured dose. For Unit 2 or Unit 3, this 
observation indicates that the backward method can 
estimate the core damage fraction and the severity 
of the accident. 
 
Table 6. Short term Effective dose (mSv) vs distance on 
various core damaged on Dai-ichi Unit 2-3 
 
Distance 
(km) 
  Short term individual effective dose vs distance on various core 
damaged on Dai-ichi Unit 2-3 (mSv) 
 
20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 
0.5 8.53E+01 9.22E+01 9.91E+01 1.06E+02 1.06E+02 
1 6.60E+01 7.21E+01 7.81E+01 8.42E+01 8.42E+01 
3 3.42E+01 3.68E+01 3.94E+01 4.20E+01 4.20E+01 
5 1.86E+01 2.02E+01 2.18E+01 2.34E+01 2.34E+01 
10 6.69E+00 7.23E+00 7.77E+00 8.31E+00 8.31E+00 
20 2.61E+00 2.78E+00 2.94E+00 3.11E+00 3.11E+00 
30 1.93E+00 2.02E+00 2.11E+00 2.19E+00 2.19E+00 
40 1.76E+00 1.85E+00 1.93E+00 2.02E+00 2.02E+00 
50 1.30E+00 1.35E+00 1.39E+00 1.44E+00 1.44E+00 
60 1.04E+00 1.07E+00 1.10E+00 1.13E+00 1.13E+00 
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Fig. 4. Short-term effective dose vs. distance for various core 
damage fractions for Dai-ichi Units 2-3. 
 
Figure 5 shows the long-term effective dose 
as a function of distance for various core damage 
fractions at Dai-ichi Units 2-3. From the data                   
in Fig. 5, the emergency response needed to 
mitigate the consequences of this accident can                
be determined. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Long-term effective dose vs distance for various core 
damage fractions for Dai-ichi Units 2-3. 
 
Comparisons between the radiation doses 
estimated using the backward method and the 
results of measurements showed differences.                 
The differences between the reports [6,8]                    
and the present results may be caused by uncertainty 
which have not been accounted for in the                     
data parameters. Among others, the uncertain 
parameters include the inaccuracies of dose 
measurements (data not accurate because of 
equipment damage by the tsunami and other 
reasons), the meteorological data (site conditions), 
the complexity of the accidents (multievent accident 
involving multiple reactors), the simplified 
postulations of the accidents, and the simplified 
assumptions on fission product release for                    
each subsystem in the reactors.  
If we base the calculations or estimations on 
official data using the model for backward 
calculations, the results obtained are similar to the 
assumptions used for the calculations of 
consequences for the severe accidents. This shows 
that the calculation model used in this study 
validated the results obtained.  The advantage of the 
model is that it can estimate or predict severity of 
accidents, thus allowing operators to more quickly 
perform rescue activities following the EOPs 
(Emergency Operating Procedures) or SAMGs 
(Severe Accident Management Guidelines) 
standards used. Another advantage of the model is 
the reduction of the uncertainties in the postulations 
or model calculations which are caused by the 
complexity of the accident. However, this method 
also has disadvantages, including that to obtain a 
more accurate estimation, the counting backwards 
method requires more calculations and the use of 
proper assumptions and postulations. In addition, 
for complicated accidents, it is difficult to decide the 
postulation to be used and to subsequently obtain 
the estimates.  
The uncertainties can be reduced by more 
accurate measurements of dose data, more complete 
and appropriate data on site conditions and 
meteorological conditions, use of more varied 
postulations for accident and assumptions for 
calculations, repetitions of simulations/calculations, 
and verification of the resulting assessment with 
calculations using previously existing methods 
(modelling using RELAP-SCDAP, MELCOR, or 
THALES) [15-17] 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The core damage fraction in a severe accident 
can be determined based on radiological 
consequences by using the backward counting 
method. Dose calculation results for a radius of              
800 m (exclusion area) for Unit 1 ranges for 140 to 
470 mSv for core damage fractions of 50% to                
80%, while for Unit 2 and Unit 3 the dose 
calculation results range from 80-103 mSv for core 
damage fractions of 20% to 40%. This method has 
advantages such as that it can allow faster 
determination of the severity of a reactor accident, 
thus allow operators to more quickly implement the 
EOPs or SAMGs. The disadvantage of this method 
is the poorer level of accuracy than what is obtained 
by the common method. The inaccuracy causing 
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this uncertainty can be reduced by performing 
simulations for more varied postulations and 
repetitive calculations. This proposed method is 
used if a severe accident is extremely complex, as is 
the case for the reactor accident in Fukushima. 
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